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Abstract
One of the main criticisms to game theory concerns the assumption of full rationality. Logit
dynamics is a decentralized algorithm in which a level of irrationality (a.k.a. “noise”) is introduced
in players’ behavior. In this context, the solution concept of interest becomes the logit equilibrium,
as opposed to Nash equilibria. Logit equilibria are distributions over strategy profiles that possess
several nice properties, including existence and uniqueness. However, there are games in which
their computation may take time exponential in the number of players. We therefore look at an
approximate version of logit equilibria, called metastable distributions, introduced by Auletta et al.
[4]. These are distributions that remain stable (i.e., players do not go too far from it) for a super-
polynomial number of steps (rather than forever, as for logit equilibria). The hope is that these
distributions exist and can be reached quickly by logit dynamics.
We identify a class of potential games, called asymptotically well-behaved, for which the behav-
ior of the logit dynamics is not chaotic as the number of players increases so to guarantee meaningful
asymptotic results. We prove that any such game admits distributions which are metastable no matter
the level of noise present in the system, and the starting profile of the dynamics. These distributions
can be quickly reached if the rationality level is not too big when compared to the inverse of the
maximum difference in potential. Our proofs build on results which may be of independent inter-
est, including some spectral characterizations of the transition matrix defined by logit dynamics for
generic games and the relationship of several convergence measures for Markov chains.
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1 Introduction
One of the most prominent assumptions in game theory dictates that people are rational. This is con-
trasted by many concrete instances of people making irrational choices in certain strategic situations,
such as stock markets [29]. This might be due to the incapacity of exactly determining one’s own utili-
ties: the strategic game is played with utilities perturbed by some noise.
Logit dynamics [7] incorporates this noise in players’ actions and then is advocated to be a good
model for people behavior. More in detail, logit dynamics features a rationality level β ≥ 0 (equivalently,
a noise level 1/β) and each player is assumed to play a strategy with a probability which is proportional
to her corresponding utility and β. So the higher β is, the less noise there is and the more rational players
are. Logit dynamics can then be seen as a noisy best-response dynamics.
The natural equilibrium concept for logit dynamics is defined by a probability distribution over the
pure strategy profiles of the game. Whilst for best-response dynamics pure Nash equilibria are stable
states, in logit dynamics there is a chance, which is inversely proportional to β, that players deviate
from such strategy profiles. Pure Nash equilibria are then not an adequate solution concept for this
dynamics. However, the random process defined by the logit dynamics can be modeled via an ergodic
Markov chain. Stability in Markov chains is represented by the concept of stationary distributions. These
distributions, dubbed logit equilibria, are suggested as a suitable solution concept in this context due to
their properties [5]. For example, from the results known in Markov chain literature, we know that any
game possesses a logit equilibrium and that this equilibrium is unique. The absence of either of these
guarantees is often considered a weakness of pure Nash equilibria. Nevertheless, as for Nash equilibria,
the computation of logit equilibria may be computationally hard depending on whether the chain mixes
rapidly or not [3].
As the hardness of computing Nash equilibria justifies approximate notions of the concept [22, 10],
so Auletta et al. [4] look at an approximation of logit equilibria that they call metastable distributions.
These distributions aim to describe regularities arising during the transient phase of the dynamics before
stationarity has been reached. Indeed, they are distributions that remain stable for a time which is long
enough for the observer (in computer science terms, this time is assumed to be super-polynomial) rather
than forever. Roughly speaking, the stability of the distributions in this concept is measured in terms of
the generations living some historical era, while stationary distributions remain stable throughout all the
generations. When the convergence to logit equilibria is too slow, then there are generations which are
outlived by the computation of the stationary distribution. For these generations, metastable distributions
grant an otherwise impossible descriptive power. (We refer the interested reader to [4] for a complete
overview of the rationale of metastability.) It is unclear whether and which strategic games possess these
distributions and if logit dynamics quickly reaches them.
The focus of this paper is the study of metastable distributions for the logit dynamics run on the class
of potential games [23]. Potential games are an important and widely studied class of games modeling
many strategic settings. Each such game satisfies a number of appealing properties, the existence of pure
Nash equilibria being one of them. A general study of metastability of potential games was left open
by [4] and assumes particular interest due to the known hardness results, see e.g. [15], which suggest
that the computation of pure Nash equilibria for them is an intractable problem, even for centralized
algorithms.
Our contribution. We aim to prove asymptotic results, in terms of the number of players n of potential
games, concerning the super-polynomially long stability of metastable distributions, and the polynomial
convergence time to them. This desiderata imposes some requirement on the potential games of interest,
for otherwise a chaotic behavior (w.r.t. n) of the logit dynamics run on a game would not allow any
meaningful asymptotic guarantee for it. We therefore identify a simple-to-describe class of potential
games, termed asymptotically well-behaved, for which the behavior of the dynamics is “almost” the
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same for any number of players. Intuitively, the potential function of a game in this class has a shape
which is, in a sense, immaterial from the actual value of n. For example, the potential might be mini-
mized when all the players agree on either strategy x or y, maximized when half of the players play x
and the other half y, and increase as the number of players playing a strategy different from that played
by the majority of players increases. The technical definition of this notion can be found in Section 5.
We stress that similar assumptions are made in related literature on logit dynamics either implicitly (as in
[24, 3], where it is assumed that certain properties of the potential function do not change as n changes),
or explicitly, by considering specific games that clearly enjoy this property [4]. Moreover, asymptotic
results on the mixing time of Markov chains do require some assumption on the behavior of the chain
(technically, the minimum bottleneck ratio must either be a polynomial or a super-polynomial) usually
implicitly guaranteed by the definition of the chain at hand. Given that our objective is much more com-
plex than bounding the mixing time (i.e., measuring asymptotically the transient phase of the chain –
defined on a potential game – and ascertain stability of and convergence time to metastable distributions)
a similar, yet stronger, requirement ought to be used.
Together with the formalization of the class of games of interest, we formalize, building upon [4], the
concept of asymptotic convergence/closeness to a metastable distribution, as a function of the number
of players of a game. We then note, via the careful construction of an ad-hoc n-player potential game
that not all potential games admit metastable distributions (cf. Section 3.1), thus showing formally that
some form of restriction of games under consideration is necessary.
Our main result proves that any asymptotically well-behaved n-player potential game has a met-
astable distribution for each starting profile of the logit dynamics. These distributions remain stable
for a time which is super-polynomial in n, if one is content of being within distance ε > 0 from the
distributions. (The distance is defined in this context as the total variation distance, see below.) We
also prove that the convergence rate to these distributions, called pseudo-mixing time, is polynomial in
n for values of β not too big when compared to the (inverse of the) maximum difference in potential of
neighboring profiles. Note that when β is very high then logit dynamics is “close” to the best-response
dynamics and therefore it is impossible to prove in general quick convergence results for potential games
due to the aforementioned hardness results. We then give a picture which is as complete as possible
relatively to the class of well-behaved potential games. (To maintain n as our only parameter of interest,
we assume that the logarithm of the number of strategies available to players is upper bounded by a
polynomial in n; this assumption can, however, be relaxed to prove bounds asymptotic in n and in the
logarithm of the maximum number of strategies.)
The proof of the above results consists of two main steps. We first devise a sufficient property
for any n-player (not necessarily potential) game to have, for any starting profile, a distribution that
is metastable for a super-polynomial number of steps and reached in polynomial time. The main idea
behind this sufficient condition is that when the dynamics starts from a subset from which it is “hard to
leave” and in which it is “easy to mix”, then the dynamics will stay for a long time close to the stationary
distribution restricted to that subset. Moreover, if a subset is “easy-to-leave,” then the dynamics will
quickly reach a “hard-to-leave” subset. The sufficient property consists of a rather technical definition
that is intuitively a partition of the profiles into subsets that are asymptotically “hard-to-leave & easy-to-
mix” or “easy-to-leave”.
The second step amounts to showing that any asymptotically well-behaved potential game admits
such a partition. The proof of this result builds on a number of involved technical contributions, some of
which might be of independent interest. They mainly concern Markov chains. The concepts of interest
are mixing time (how long the chain takes to mix), bottleneck ratio (intuitively, how hard it is for the
stationary distribution to leave a subset of states), hitting time (how long the chain takes to hit a certain
subset of states) and spectral properties of the transition matrix of Markov chains. In particular, we define
a procedure which computes the required partition for these games. We iteratively identify in the set of
pure strategy profiles the “hard-to-leave” subsets. To prove that these subsets are “easy-to-mix”, we
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firstly relate the pseudo-mixing time to the mixing time of a certain family of restricted Markov chains.
We then prove that the mixing time of these chains is polynomial by using a spectral characterization
of the transition matrix of restricted Markov chains. Finally, the proof that the remaining profiles are
“easy-to-leave” mainly relies on a connection between bottleneck ratio and hitting time. Specifically,
we prove both an upper bound and a lower bound on the hitting time of a subset of states in terms of the
bottleneck ratio of its complement.
We remark that, as a byproduct of our result, we essentially close an open problem of [4] about
metastability of the Curie-Weiss game.
In appendix, we complement the above contributions along two different dimensions. Firstly, the
“simple” definition of asymptotic well-behaved games comes at the cost of sacrificing the full generality
of the argument, in that a refinement of the condition actually suffices for our main result (see Section
C). Secondly, we prove further spectral results about the transition matrix of Markov chains defined by
logit dynamics for a strategic (not necessarily potential) game (cf. Section D). These results enhance our
understanding of the dynamics and pave the way to further advancements in the area.
Related works. Blume [7] introduced logit dynamics for modeling a noisy-rational behavior in game
dynamics. Early works about this dynamics have focused on its long-term behavior: Blume [7] showed
that, for 2× 2 coordination games and potential games, the long-term behavior of the system is concen-
trated around a specific Nash equilibrium; Alo`s-Ferrer and Netzer [1] gave a general characterization of
long-term behavior of logit dynamics for wider classes of games. Several works gave bounds on the time
that the dynamics takes to reach specific Nash equilibria of a game: Ellison [14] considered graphical
coordination games on cliques and rings; Peyton Young [27] and Montanari and Saberi [24] extended
this work to more general families of graphs; Asadpour and Saberi [2] focused on a class of conges-
tion games. Auletta et al. [5] were the first to propose the stationary distribution of the logit dynamics
Markov chain as a new equilibrium concept in game theory and to focus on the time the dynamics takes
to get close to this equilibrium [3].
In physics, chemistry, and biology, metastability is a phenomenon related to the evolution of systems
under noisy dynamics. In particular, metastability concerns moves between regions of the state spaces
and the existence of multiple, well separated time scales: at short time scales, the system appears to
be in a quasi-equilibrium, but really explores only a confined region of the available space state, while,
at larger time scales, it undergoes transitions between such different regions. Previous research about
metastability aims at expressing typical features of a metastable state and to evaluate the transition
time between metastable states. Several monographs on the subject are available in literature (see, for
example, [16, 25, 8, 17]). Auletta et al. [4] applied metastability to probability distributions, introducing
the concepts of metastable distribution and pseudo-mixing time and proving results for some specific
potential games.
Roughly speaking, metastability is a kind of approximation for stationarity. From this point of
view, metastable distributions may be likened to approximate equilibria. Two different approaches to
approximated equilibria have been proposed in literature. In the multiplicative version [10] a profile is
an approximate equilibrium as long as each player gains at least a factor (1−ε) of the payoff she gets by
playing any other strategy: these equilibria have been shown to be computationally hard both in general
[11] and for congestion games [30]. In the additive version [19], a profile is an approximate equilibrium
as long as each player gains at least the payoff she gains by playing any other strategy minus a small
additive factor ε > 0: for these equilibria a quasi-polynomial time approximation scheme exists [22] but
it is impossible to have an FPTAS [9].
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2 Preliminary definitions
A strategic game G is a triple ([n],S,U), where [n] = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of players, S =
(S1, . . . , Sn) is a family of non-empty finite sets (Si is the set of strategies available to player i), and
U = (u1, . . . , un) is a family of utility functions (or payoffs), where ui : S → R, S = S1 × . . . × Sn
being the set of all strategy profiles, is the utility function of player i. We let m denote an upper bound
to the size of players’ strategy sets, that is, m ≥ maxi=1,...,n |Si|. We focus on (exact) potential games,
i.e., games for which there exists a function Φ: S → R such that for any pair of x,y ∈ S, y = (x−i, yi),
we have:
Φ(x)− Φ(y) = ui(y)− ui(x).
Note that we use the standard game theoretic notation (x−i, s) to mean the vector obtained from x by
replacing the i-th entry with s; i.e. (x−i, s) = (x1, . . . , xi−1, s, xi+1, . . . , xn). A strategy profile x is
a Nash equilibrium1 if, for all i, ui(x) ≥ ui(x−i, si), for all si ∈ Si. It is fairly easy to see that local
minima of the potential function correspond to the Nash equilibria of the game.
For two vectors x,y, we denote with H(x,y) = |{i : xi 6= yi}| the Hamming distance between
x and y. For every x ∈ S, N(x) = {y ∈ S : H(x,y) = 1} denotes the set of neighbors of x and
Ni(x) = {y ∈ N(x) : y−i = x−i} is the set of those neighbors that differ exactly in the i-th coordinate.
In this paper, given a set of profiles L we let L denote its complementary set, i.e., L = S \ L.
Moreover, we say that a set L is connected if, for every x,y ∈ L, there are x0,x1, . . . ,xk ∈ L with
x0 = x, xk = y and H(xi−1,xi) = 1 for each i = 1, ldots, k.
2.1 Logit dynamics
The logit dynamics has been introduced in [7] and runs as follows: at every time step (i) Select one
player i ∈ [n] uniformly at random; (ii) Update the strategy of player i according to the Boltzmann
distribution with parameter β over the set Si of her strategies. That is, a strategy si ∈ Si will be selected
with probability
σi(si | x−i) = 1
Zi(x−i)
eβui(x−i,si), (1)
where x−i denotes the profile of strategies played at the current time step by players different from i,
Zi(x−i) =
∑
zi∈Si e
βui(x−i,zi) is the normalizing factor, and β ≥ 0. One can see parameter β as the
inverse of the noise or, equivalently, the rationality level of the system: indeed, from (1), it is easy
to see that for β = 0 player i selects her strategy uniformly at random, for β > 0 the probability is
biased toward strategies promising higher payoffs, and for β that goes to infinity player i chooses her
best response strategy (if more than one best response is available, she chooses one of them uniformly
at random).
The above dynamics defines a Markov chain {Xt}t∈N with the set of strategy profiles as state space,
and where the transition probability from profile x = (x1, . . . , xn) to profile y = (y1, . . . , yn), denoted
P (x,y) = Px (X1 = y)
2, is zero if H(x,y) ≥ 2 and it is 1nσi(yi | x−i) if the two profiles differ
exactly at player i. More formally, we can define the logit dynamics as follows.
Definition 2.1. Let G = ([n],S,U) be a strategic game and let β ≥ 0. The logit dynamics for G is the
1In this paper, we only focus on pure Nash equilibria. We avoid explicitly mentioning it throughout.
2Throughout this work, we denote with Px (·) the probability of an event conditioned on the starting state of the logit
dynamics being x.
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Markov chainMβ = ({Xt}t∈N, S, P ) where S = S1 × · · · × Sn and
P (x,y) =
1
n
·

σi(yi | x−i), if y−i = x−i and yi 6= xi;
n∑
i=1
σi(yi | x−i), if y = x;
0, otherwise;
(2)
where σi(yi | x−i) is defined in (1).
The Markov chain defined by (2) is ergodic [7]. Hence, from every initial profile x the distribution
P t(x, ·) over states of S of the chainXt starting at xwill eventually converge to a stationary distribution
pi as t tends to infinity. As in [5], we call the stationary distribution pi of the Markov chain defined by
the logit dynamics on a game G, the logit equilibrium of G. In general, a Markov chain with transition
matrix P and state space S is said to be reversible with respect to a distribution pi if, for all x,y ∈ S,
it holds that pi(x)P (x,y) = pi(y)P (y,x). If an ergodic chain is reversible with respect to pi, then pi is
its stationary distribution. Therefore when this happens, to simplify our exposition we simply say that
the matrix P is reversible. For the class of potential games the stationary distribution is the well-known
Gibbs measure.
Theorem 2.1 ([7]). If G = ([n],S,U) is a potential game with potential function Φ, then the Markov
chain given by (2) is reversible with respect to the Gibbs measure pi(x) = 1Z e
−βΦ(x), where Z =∑
y∈S e
−βΦ(y) is the normalizing constant.
It is worthwhile to notice that logit dynamics for potential games and Glauber dynamics for Gibbs
distributions are two ways of looking at the same Markov chain (see [7] for details). This, in particular,
implies that we can write
σi(si | x−i) = e
−βΦ(x−i,si)∑
z∈Si e
−βΦ(x−i,z) .
2.2 Convergence of Markov chains
Mixing time. Arguably, the principal notion to measure the rate of convergence of a Markov chain to
its stationary distribution is the mixing time, which is defined as follows. Let us set
d(t) = max
x∈S
∥∥P t(x, ·)− pi∥∥
TV
,
where the total variation distance ‖µ− ν‖TV between two probability distributions µ and ν on the same
state space S is defined as
‖µ− ν‖TV = max
A⊂S
|µ(A)− ν(A)| = 1
2
∑
x∈S
|µ(x)− ν(x)|.
For 0 < ε < 1/2, the mixing time of the logit dynamics is defined as
tmix(ε) = min{t ∈ N : d(t) ≤ ε}.
It is usual to set ε = 1/4 or ε = 1/2e. We write tmix to mean tmix(1/4) and we refer generically to
“mixing time” when the actual value of ε is immaterial. Observe that tmix(ε) ≤
⌈
log2 ε
−1⌉ tmix.
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Relaxation time. Another important measure of convergence for Markov chains is given by the relax-
ation time. Let P be the transition matrix of a Markov chain with finite state space S; let us label the
eigenvalues of P in non-increasing order
λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ · · · ≥ λ|S|.
It is well-known (see, for example, Lemma 12.1 in [21]) that λ1 = 1 and, if P is ergodic, then λ2 < 1
and λ|S| > −1. We set λ? as the largest eigenvalue in absolute value other than λ1,
λ? = max
i=2,...,|S|
{|λi|} .
The relaxation time trel of a Markov chainM is defined as
trel =
1
1− λ? .
The relaxation time is related to the mixing time by the following theorem (see, for example, Theorems
12.3 and 12.4 in [21]).
Theorem 2.2 (Relaxation time). Let P be the transition matrix of an ergodic and reversible Markov
chain with state space S and stationary distribution pi. Then
(trel − 1) log 2 ≤ tmix ≤ log
(
4
pimin
)
trel,
where pimin = minx∈S pi(x).
Hitting time. In some cases, we are interested in bounding the first time that the chain hits a profile
in a certain set of states, also known as its hitting time. Formally, for a set L ⊆ S, we denote by τL
the random variable denoting the hitting time of L. Note that the hitting time, differently from mixing
and relaxation time, depends on where the dynamics starts. Some useful facts about hitting time are
summarized in Appendix A.
Bottleneck ratio. Quite central in our study is the concept of bottleneck ratio. Consider an ergodic
Markov chain with finite state space S, transition matrix P , and stationary distribution pi. The probability
distribution Q(x,y) = pi(x)P (x,y) is of particular interest and is sometimes called the edge stationary
distribution. Note that if the chain is reversible then Q(x,y) = Q(y,x). For any L ⊆ S, L 6= ∅, we let
Q(L, S \ L) = ∑x∈L,y∈S\LQ(x,y). Then the bottleneck ratio of L is
B(L) =
Q(L, S \ L)
pi(L)
.
We use the following theorem to derive lower bounds to the mixing time (see, for example, Theorem 7.3
in [21]).
Theorem 2.3 (Bottleneck ratio). LetM = {Xt : t ∈ N} be an ergodic Markov chain with state space
S, transition matrix P , and stationary distribution pi. Let L ⊆ S be any set with pi(L) ≤ 1/2. Then the
mixing time is
tmix ≥ 1
4B(L)
.
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The bottleneck ratio is also strictly related to the relaxation time. Indeed, let
B? = min
L : pi(R)≤1/2
B(L),
then the following theorem holds (see, for example, Theorem 13.14 in [21]).
Theorem 2.4. Let P be the transition matrix of an ergodic and reversible Markov chain with state space
S. Let λ2 be the second largest eigenvalue of P . Then
B2?
2
≤ 1− λ2 ≤ 2B?.
3 Metastability
In this section we give formal definitions of metastable distributions and pseudo-mixing time. We also
survey some of the tools used for our results. For a more detailed description we refer the reader to [4].
Definition 3.1. Let P be the transition matrix of a Markov chain with finite state space S. A probability
distribution µ over S is (ε, T )-metastable for P (or simply metastable, for short) if for every 0 ≤ t ≤ T
it holds that ∥∥µP t − µ∥∥
TV
≤ ε.
The definition of metastable distribution captures the idea of a distribution that behaves approxi-
mately like the stationary distribution: if we start from such a distribution and run the chain we stay
close to it for a “long” time. Some interesting properties of metastable distributions are discussed in [4],
including the following lemmata, that turn out to be useful for proving our results.
Lemma 3.1 ([4]). Let P be a Markov chain with finite state space S and stationary distribution pi. For
a subset of states L ⊆ S let piL be the stationary distribution conditioned on L, i.e.
piL(x) =
{
pi(x)/pi(L), if x ∈ L;
0, otherwise.
(3)
Then, piL is (B(L), 1)-metastable.
Lemma 3.2 ([4]). If µ is (ε, 1)-metastable for P then µ is (εT , T )-metastable for P .
Among all metastable distributions, we are interested in the ones that are quickly reached from a
(possibly large) set of states. This motivates the following definition.
Definition 3.2. Let P be the transition matrix of a Markov chain with state space S, let L ⊆ S be a
non-empty set of states and let µ be a probability distribution over S. We define the pseudo-mixing time
tLµ(ε) as
tLµ(ε) = inf{t ∈ N :
∥∥P t(x, ·)− µ∥∥
TV
≤ ε for all x ∈ L}.
Since the stationary distribution pi of an ergodic Markov chain is reached within ε in time tmix(ε)
from every state, according to Definition 3.2 we have that tSpi(ε) = tmix(ε). The following simple lemma
connects metastability and pseudo-mixing time.
Lemma 3.3 ([4]). Let µ be a (ε, T )-metastable distribution and let L ⊆ S be a set of states such that
tLµ(ε) is finite. Then for every x ∈ L it holds that
∥∥P t(x, ·)− µ∥∥
TV
≤ 2ε for every tLµ(ε) ≤ t ≤
tLµ(ε) + T .
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3.1 Asymptotic metastability
The notions and results introduced above apply to a single Markov chain. Auletta et al. [4] adopted
these notions to evaluate the behavior of the logit dynamics for potential games, as n grows. Therefore,
we do not have a single Markov chain but a sequence of them, one for each number n of players, and
need to consider an asymptotic counterpart of the notions above. Auletta et al. [4], in fact, showed that
the logit dynamics for specific classes of n-player potential games enjoys the following property, that
we name asymptotic metastability.
Definition 3.3. Let G be an n-player strategic game. We say that the logit dynamics for G is asymp-
totically metastable for the rationality level β if there are constants n0, ε > 0, a polynomial p = pε
and a super-polynomial q = qε such that for each n ≥ n0, the logit dynamics for the n-player game G
converges in time at most p(n) from each profile of G to a (ε, q(n))-metastable distribution.
When the logit dynamics for a game is (not) asymptotically metastable, we say for brevity that the
game itself is (not) asymptotically metastable. Unfortunately, asymptotic metastability cannot be proved
for every (potential) game as shown next.
Lemma 3.4. There is a n-player (potential) game G which is not asymptotically metastable for any β
sufficiently high and any ε < 14 .
Proof. We will show a game G and a profile x of this game such that for any 0 < ε < 1/4, for infinitely
many value of n and for each polynomial p in n and each super-polynomial q in n, the logit dynamics
for G does not converge in time at most p(n) from x to any (ε, q(n))-metastable distribution, even if the
mixing time of the dynamics is larger than p.
Consider now the following pairs (pj , qj), where pj = nj and qj = exp
(
log n · log(j)n
)
, where
log(j) is the j-th functional iteration of the logarithm function. Let us denote as nj a value such that
pj(nj) < qj(nj) − ε. Such a value surely exists since p is polynomial and q is super-polynomial.
Moreover, observe that for each n > nj , we have pj(n) < qj(n) − ε. Thus, we can assume without
loss of generality that 1 = n0 < n1 < n2 < . . .. Now let T be a function that is asymptotically
sandwiched between pj and qj , for any j. This can be guaranteed by letting T be a function such that
T (n) = qj(n) − ε for j such that nj−1 < n ≤ nj . Note that for any pj and for any n ≥ nj , we have
T (n) = qk(n) − ε > pk(n) ≥ pj(n), where k ≥ j is such that nk−1 < n ≤ nk. Similarly, for any qj
and for any n ≥ nj we have T (n) = qk(n)− ε < qk(n) ≤ qj(n). The situation is depicted in Figure 1.
Let now G be a n-player potential game such that each player has exactly two strategies, say 0 and
1. Consider the potential function Φ such that for any t = 0, . . . , n − 1 and any profile x wherein
exactly t players play strategy 1 we have Φ(x) = n − t, while Φ(1, . . . , 1) = 1 + kn, where kn =
1
β log
(T (n)
ε − 1
)
, β being the rationality parameter of the logit dynamics. Observe that if there is a pair
(p, q) with p polynomial in n and q super-polynomial in n such that it is possible to prove that the logit
dynamics for G is asymptotic metastable with parameters p and q, then there is j? such that the results
holds also with (pj? , qj?) in place of p and q, where (pj? , qj?) corresponds to one of the pair of functions
described above in the definition of the game G. Hence, in order to prove the lemma is sufficient to show
that it holds only for pairs (pj , qj) as described above.
Note that, by taking β sufficiently high, we have that: (i) pi(0, . . . , 0) ≥ 12 ; (ii) there exists a j such
that, for any subset L ⊆ {0, 1}n \ {(0, . . . , 0), (1, . . . , 1)}, the bottleneck ratio B(L) is at least the
inverse of pj ; (iii) the bottleneck ratio B(1, . . . , 1) = εT (n) .
Firstly note that the mixing time of logit dynamics for G is not polynomial. Indeed, from Theo-
rem 2.3, it follows that the mixing time is at least T4ε . However, as suggested above, for each pj , we
have T4ε > T > pj for infinitely many n, and hence the mixing time is asymptotically greater than any
polynomial pj .
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j. . .1 nj
nlog
(j)(n)
nj+1j + 1
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Figure 1: The figure shows how T (n) is built around the functions pj’s and qj’s so that it is hard to
classify T (n) either as a polynomial or as a super-polynomial. Note that T (n) is the inverse of the
bottleneck ratio of profile (1, . . . , 1) and thus it describes the time needed to leave that profile.
We next discuss that no metastable distribution is stable for a super-polynomial time or, even if there
is one, it cannot be reached in polynomial time. From Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2, we have that for
each n the distribution pi1 that assigns probability 1 to the profile (1, . . . , 1) is (ε, T (n))-metastable.
However, as suggested above, for each qj , the function T is smaller than qj for infinitely many n.
Thus, the distribution pi1 is metastable for time that is asymptotically smaller than any super-polynomial
qj . Note that this argument extends to any (3ε, T (n))-metastable distribution µ that is within distance
2ε from pi1. Finally, observe that, the remaining distributions that are far from pi1 cannot be reached
quickly from (1, . . . , 1). In fact, from Lemma 5.9 below, for any polynomial pj the probability that the
logit dynamics leaves the profile (1, . . . , 1) in pj steps, is at most
ε·pj
T −ε < ε, for n sufficiently large.
Hence, for any pj , starting from (1, . . . , 1) the pseudo-mixing time of any distribution µ that is at least
2ε-far from pi1 is asymptotically greater than pj .
Remark 3.1. The game described in the proof of Lemma 3.4 also shows the necessity of having a
definition of asymptotic metastability as the one given in Definition 3.3.
Consider, indeed, the weaker definition of asymptotic metastability in which for each n there is a
polynomial pn(n) and a super-polynomial qn(n) governing convergence and stability time of metasta-
bility, respectively (i.e., a definition in which the order of quantifiers is reversed). This concept might
at first glance look meaningful. However, it is instead of scarce significance as the distinction between
polynomials and super-polynomials might become null in the limit.
The game in Lemma 3.4 exemplifies this phenomenon, since it does not satisfies the metastability
notion given in the one in Definition 3.3, but it satisfies this weak notion. Indeed, for any n, there
is a super-polynomial function, namely q˜n = qj − ε for j such that nj−1 < n ≤ nj , such that pi1 is
(ε, q˜n(n))-metastable. Obviously, the pseudo-mixing time of this distribution from the profile (1, . . . , 1)
is 1. From the remaining profiles, the dynamics quickly converges to the stationary distribution for any
β sufficiently large (this follows from well-known results about birth-and-death chains).
Motivated by the result above, we next give a sufficient property for any (not necessarily potential)
game to be asymptotically metastable. Such a condition will help identifying the class of asymptotically
metastable potential games.
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4 Asymptotic metastability and partitioned games
In this section we will introduce the concept of game partitioned by the logit dynamics. Then we give
examples of games satisfying this notion. Finally, we prove that games partitioned by the logit dynamics
are asymptotically metastable.
Henceforth, we will assume that the logarithm of the maximal number of strategies available to a
player is at most a polynomial in n. Specifically, we denote as m(·) the function such that m(n) is the
maximum number of strategies available to a player in G when the number of players is n. Then, we will
assume that the function logm(·) is at most polynomial in its input. We can easily drop this assumption
by asking for results that are asymptotic in log |S|, where |S| denotes the function returning the number
of profiles of the game: each one of our proof can be rewritten according to this requirement with very
small changes. Note that having results asymptotic in the logarithm of the number of states is a common
requirement in Markov chain literature. Moreover, since |S| for a game with n players is at mostm(n)n,
this requirement is equivalent to asking for results asymptotic in n and in the logarithm of the function
m.
Note also that we focus only on n-player (not necessarily potential) games and values of β such
that the mixing time of the logit dynamics is at least super-polynomial in n, otherwise the stationary
distribution enjoys the desired properties of stability and convergence. Throughout the rest of the paper
we will denote with β0 the smaller value of β such that the mixing time is not polynomial.
4.1 Games partitioned by the logit dynamics
Let G be an n-player game. Let P be the transition matrix of the logit dynamics on G and let pi be the
corresponding stationary distribution. For L ⊆ S non-empty, we define a Markov chain with state space
L and transition matrix P˚L defined as follows.
P˚L(x,y) =
P (x,y) if x 6= y;1−∑z∈L,
z 6=x
P (x, z) = P (x,x) +
∑
z∈S\L P (x, z) otherwise.
(4)
It easy to check that the stationary distribution of this Markov chain is given by the distribution piL(x) =
pi(x)
pi(L) , for every x ∈ L. Note also that the Markov chain defined upon P˚L is aperiodic, since the Markov
chain defined upon P is, and it will be irreducible if L is a connected set. For a fixed ε > 0, we will
denote with tLmix(ε) the mixing time of the chain described in (4). We also denote with BL(A) the
bottleneck ratio of A ⊂ L in the Markov chain with state space L and transition matrix P˚L.
We are now ready to introduce the definition of partitioned games.
Definition 4.1. Let G be an n-player strategic game and let us denote with S its profile space. We say
that G is partitioned by the logit dynamics for the rationality level β if there are constants n0, ε > 0,
a polynomial p = pε and a super-polynomial q = qε such that for each n ≥ n0 there is a family of
connected subsets R1, . . . , Rk of S, with k ≥ 1, and a partition T1, . . . , Tk, N of S, with Ti ⊆ Ri for
any i = 1, . . . , k, such that
1. the bottleneck ratio of Ri is at most 1/q(n), for any i = 1, . . . , k;
2. the mixing time tRimix(ε) is at most p(n), for any i = 1, . . . , k;
3. for any i = 1, . . . , k and for any x ∈ Ti, it holds that
Px
(
τS\Ri ≤ tRimix(ε)
)
≤ ε;
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4. for any x ∈ N , it holds that
Px
(
τ⋃
i Ti
≤ p(n)) ≥ 1− ε.
Note that we allow in the above definition that Ti, for some i = 1, . . . , k, or N are empty. In this
context, we call Ti the core of Ri, i ≤ k.
The main result of this section proves that a game partitioned by the logit dynamics is asymptotically
metastable.
Theorem 4.1. Let G be n-player game. If G is partitioned by the logit dynamics for β, then the logit
dynamics for G is asymptotically metastable for the given β.
Before going into the details of the proof, we relate the technical notion of partitioned games with
examples of actual games satisfying it as well as comment on games not enjoying it. All of our examples
will be potential games.
4.2 Examples of partitioned games
Three classes of n-player games, namely pure coordination games, Curie-Weiss games and graphical
coordination games on the ring, have been proven asymptotically metastable [4]. Here we will show
that any of these games is partitioned by the logit dynamics, whereas the game of Lemma 3.4 is not
partitioned by the logit dynamics.
Pure coordination games. The pure coordination game is an n-player game where players have the
same strategy set A and each player is happy when all players adopt the same strategy and unhappy
otherwise.
Specifically, in [4], they consider the case in which each agent can choose between two strategies,
namely +1 and −1; each agent has utility 1 if all the players adopt the same strategy and utility 0
otherwise. The mixing time of the logit dynamics for these games is polynomial for β = O(log n) and
super-polynomial otherwise. Auletta et al. [4] show asymptotic metastability for any β = ω(log n).
Next lemma proves that n-player pure coordination games are partitioned by the logit dynamics.
Lemma 4.1. Let G be an n-player pure coordination game. Then G is partitioned by the logit dynamics
for any β = ω(log n).
Proof. Consider the following subsets of S: R1 = {p}, R2 = {m} and R3 = {+1,−1}n \ {p,m},
where p = (+1)n and m = (−1)n. As showed in [4], the bottleneck ratio of these subsets is super-
polynomial for any β = ω(log n). Moreover, the mixing time of the chains restricted to R1 and R2 is
trivially polynomial. As for R3, observe that the stationary distribution of the restricted chain is very
close to the stationary distribution of a lazy random walk on a n-dimensional hypercube, whose mixing
time is known to be polynomial (see, e.g., [21]).
Also let us consider the following partition of S: Ti = Ri for i = 1, 2, 3 and N is empty. Clearly,
T1 and T2 satisfy the property required by the definition of partitioned games. This holds also for T3.
Indeed, consider a birth and death chain (see Section 2.5 in [21]) defined on the state space {0, 1, . . . ,m}
with transition probability:
p0 = qm = r0 = rm =
1
2
, q0 = pm = 0; pi =
m− i
4m
, qi =
m+ i
4m
, ri =
1
2
, for i = 1, . . . ,m− 1;
where pi is the probability of going from state i to state i+ 1, qi is the probability of going from state i
to state i− 1 and ri is the probability to stay in state i.
Now observe that the expected hitting time of either p or m is equivalent to the expected hitting
time of state3 m = n/2 in the above birth an death chain. Indeed, the latter can be seen as the projection
3Here, we are assuming n is even. The case for odd n is similar.
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of our chain, where the state x of our chain is projected to the state i of the birth and death chain, such
that the minimum among the zeros and the ones in x is n2 − i. It is then easy to check that the expected
hitting time of m is super-polynomial in n from any starting state (see Section 2.5 in [21]). The claim
finally follows by a simple application of Markov’s inequality.
The Curie-Weiss model. Consider now the following game-theoretic formulation of the well-studied
Curie-Weiss model (the Ising model on the complete graph), that we will call CW-game: each one of
n players has two strategies, −1 and +1, and the utility of player i for profile x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈
{−1,+1}n is ui(x) = xi
∑
j 6=i xj . Observe that for every player i it holds that
ui(x−i,+1)− ui(x−i,−1) = H(x−i,−1)−H(x−i,+1),
whereH(x) = −∑j 6=k xjxk, hence the CW-game is a potential game with potential functionH.
It is known (see Chapter 15 in [21]) that the logit dynamics for this game (or equivalently the
Glauber dynamics for the Curie-Weiss model) has mixing time polynomial in n for β < 1/n and super-
polynomial as long as β > 1/n. Moreover, [4] describes metastable distributions for β > c log n/n and
shows that such distributions are quickly reached from profiles where the number of +1 (respectively
−1) is a sufficiently large majority, namely if the magnetization k is such that k2 > c log n/β, where
the magnetization of a profile x is defined as M(x) =
∑
i xi.
It has been left open what happens when β lies in the interval (1/n, c log n/n) and if a metastable
distribution is quickly reached when in the starting point the number of +1 is close to the number of−1.
We observe that next lemma, along with Theorem 4.1 essentially closes this problem by showing that
CW-games are asymptotic metastable for β ≥ c/n for some constant c > 1.
Lemma 4.2. Let G be the n-player CW-game. Then G is partitioned by the logit dynamics for any
β > c/n, for constant c > 1.
Proof. Let S+ (resp., S−) be the set of profiles with positive (resp., negative) magnetization and let us
set R1 = S+ and R2 = S−. It is known that the bottleneck ratio of these subset is super-polynomial for
any β > c/n, for constant c > 1, (see, e.g., Chapter 15 in [21]). Moreover, in [20] it has been proved
that the mixing time of the chain restricted to S+ (resp. S−) is actually c1n log n for some constant
c1 > 0
4.
Let now ζ be the unique positive root [12, 13] of the function
f(x) =
eβx(1− x)− e−βx(1 + x)
eβx(1− x) + e−βx(1 + x) .
Observe that ζ ∈ [0, 1], it is non decreasing in β and does not depend on n. Let now Z+ be the set of
profiles with magnetization k ≥ ζn and Z− be the set of profiles with magnetization k ≤ −ζn. Note
that for a constant c > 1 and n sufficiently large, we have that |k| ≥ 1 [13].
Consider now the following partition of S: T1 = Z+, T2 = Z− and N = S \ (Z+ ∪Z−). We prove
that from any profile x ∈ Z+ the dynamics hits a profile y ∈ S− in a time equivalent to the mixing time
of the chain restricted to S+ with probability at most ε. Consider, indeed, the magnetization chain, i.e.,
the birth and death chain on the space {−n, 2− n, . . . , n − 2, n}. Then we are interested in the hitting
time τl of l ≤ 0 when the starting point is k. Clearly, in order to reach magnetization l it is necessary to
reach magnetization k′, with l < k′ < k. And for reaching l from k′ it is necessary to reach k′′ such that
l ≤ k′′ < k′. Then, we show that there is k′ from which the chain quickly goes back to nζ with high
4The result in [20] refers to censored chains, that are exactly the same as our restricted chain, except that the probability
that the original chain from a profile x goes out from L is “reflected” to some profile in L different from x, instead than being
“added” to the probability to stay in x. It is immediate to see how their result extends also to our restricted chains.
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probability without ever hitting the profile k′′. In particular, in [12, Theorem 4.10] it has been showed
that there are k′ and k′′ such that
Pk′ (τnζ ≤ c2n log n) ≥ 1− o(1) and Pk′ (τk′′ ≥ c2n log n) ≥ 1− o(1).
Hence, it follows that
Pk (τl ≥ c1n log n) ≥ (1− o(1))κ = 1− o(1),
where κ is a constant. (Clearly, everything holds symmetrically by considering the set Z−.)
Finally, observe that from [12] (Theorems 4.4, 4.9 and 4.10 – see also [13]), we have that for each
profile x ∈ N , the hitting time of T1 ∪ T2 is polynomial with high probability.
Graphical coordination game on the ring. Finally consider a graphical coordination game on the
ring, in which the n players are identified by the vertices of a ring R = (V,E). For each edge of R, the
endpoints play the following two-strategy coordination game:
+1 −1
+1 a, a c, d
−1 d, c b, b
where a > d and b > c. Each player picks a strategy and uses it for each coordination game in which
she is involved. The utility of a player is the sum of the utilities for each coordination game she plays.
It is known [3, 6] that the mixing time of the logit dynamics for this game is polynomial in n for
β = O(log n) and greater than any polynomial in n for β = ω(log n). Moreover, in [4] it has been
showed that for this game asymptotic metastability holds.
Lemma 4.3. Let G be an n-player graphical coordination game on the ring. Then G is partitioned by
the logit dynamics for any β = ω(log n).
Proof. Let R1 = {p} and R2 = {m}, p and m defined as in the proof of Lemma 4.1. Note that the
bottleneck ratio of R1 and R2 is known to be super-polynomial for β = ω(log n) and the mixing time
of the chains restricted to R1 and R2 is trivially polynomial.
Consider now the following partition of S: T1 = {p}, T2 = {m} and N = {+1,−1}n \ {p,m}.
Clearly, T1 and T2 satisfy the property required by the definition of partitioned games. Finally, the results
in [4] show that the hitting time of either p or m when the chain starts from x ∈ N is polynomial.
The game of Lemma 3.4. Finally, we consider the non-asymptotically metastable game of Lemma
3.4 and prove the following corollary of Theorem 4.1.
Lemma 4.4. Let G be the game defined in Lemma 3.4. Then, for any β sufficiently large, G is not
partitioned by the logit dynamics.
Proof. The bottleneck of (1, . . . , 1) is asymptotically larger than any polynomial and smaller than
any super-polynomial. Hence this profile cannot be contained in N and it is not possible that Ri =
{(1, . . . , 1)} for some i. Thus, it must be the case that Ri = L for some subset L ⊆ S, such that
(1, . . . , 1) ∈ L, and L 6= {(1, . . . , 1)}. Then, for β sufficiently large piL(1, . . . , 1) ≤ 1/2. But, since
the bottleneck of (1, . . . , 1) is asymptotically larger than any polynomial, the mixing time of the chain
restricted to L is not polynomial.
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4.3 Proof of Theorem 4.1
A high level idea of the proof is discussed next. We initially need to define the metastable distributions
to which the logit dynamics converges. To describe the distributions of interest for the given n-player
game G, we leverage known results connecting bottleneck ratio and metastability. In particular, it turns
out that the stationary distribution of the dynamics restricted to of a subset of profiles with bottleneck
ratio at most the inverse of a super-polynomial, as defined in (3), is metastable for a super-polynomial
amount of time (Theorem 3.1). In this way we can easily “build” metastable distributions from the sets
Ri given by the definition of partitioned games (cf. Proposition 4.1).
What about the pseudo-mixing time of this distribution? We distinguish two cases. First we consider
profiles that are in the “core” of the support of this distribution, namely the sets Ti given by the definition
of partitioned game. We show that the pseudo-mixing time from these profiles is related to the mixing
time of the dynamics restricted to Ri as described in (4) (see Corollary 4.1). Then, being the mixing
time of the chains restricted to Ri polynomial, it follows that the pseudo-mixing time from the core is
polynomial.
What about out-of-core profiles? Suppose that there is a profile from which the dynamics takes long
time to converge to a metastable distribution. Then it must be the case that the dynamics takes long time
to hit the core of one such distribution with high probability. However, this cannot be the case since, by
definition of partitioned games, the logit dynamics from any non-core profile quickly hits a profile in the
core of some distribution.
Next we formally prove Theorem 4.1. In particular, the proof follows from the Propositions 4.1, 4.2
and 4.3 given below that, respectively, describe the metastable distributions, bound the pseudo-mixing
time from the core, and evaluate the behavior of the dynamics starting from non-core profiles.
Metastable distributions. We start by proving that some distributions defined on the sets Ri are
metastable for super-polynomial time.
Proposition 4.1. Let G be a n-player game and consider the stationary distribution pi of the logit dy-
namics for G. If G is partitioned by the logit dynamics for β, then for every ε > 0 there exists a function
T = Tε at least super-polynomial in the input such that for each5 i, and n large enough, the distribution
µi that sets µi(x) = pi(x)/pi(Ri) is (ε, T (n))-metastable for the given β.
Proof. Fix i. Given ε > 0, consider the function T = Tε such that T (n) = εB(Ri) ≥ εq(n), where Ri is
the support of µi. By the definition of q, T is at least super-polynomial in the input.
By Lemma 3.1, µi is (B(Ri), 1)-metastable. By Lemma 3.2, µi is also (B(Ri) · T (n), T (n))-
metastable. The lemma follows since B(Ri) · T (n) = ε.
Finally, the following lemma shows that a combination of metastable distributions is metastable.
Lemma 4.5. Let P the transition matrix of a Markov chain with state space S and let µi be a distribution
(εi, Ti)-metastable for P , for i = 1, 2, . . .. Set ε = maxi εi and T = mini{Ti}. Then, the distribution
µ =
∑
i αiµi, with
∑
i αi = 1 and αi ≥ 0, is (ε, T )-metastable.
Proof. For every t ≤ T we have∥∥µP t − µ∥∥
TV
= max
A⊆S
∣∣(µP t)(A)− µ(A)∣∣
5There can be values of n for which the partition does not use the i-th “component” and thus Ri, Ti and µi are not well
defined. However, as long as there are infinite values of n for which Ri is given then asymptotic bounds on the metastability
and the pseudo-mixing time of µi are well defined. Since the partition contains at least one “component” for any input, we
have that there exists n0 such that for i ≤ maxn≥n0 k(n), Ri is defined infinite times.
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= max
A⊆S
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i
αi
(
(µiP
t)(A)− µi(A)
)∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
i
αi max
A⊆S
∣∣(µiP t)(A)− µi(A)∣∣ ≤ ε.
Pseudo-mixing time from the core. Now we prove that the logit dynamics for a n-player partitioned
game converges in polynomial time to the metastable distribution µi defined above, whenever the starting
point is selected from the core Ti of this distribution. Specifically, we prove the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2. Let G be a n-player game and fix ε > 0. If G is partitioned by the logit dynamics for
β, then there is a function p? at most polynomial in the input such that for the given β, for each i and
for n large enough, the pseudo-mixing time of µi from Ti is tTiµi(2ε) = O(p?(n)).
In order to prove Proposition 4.2, for L ⊆ S non-empty, consider the Markov chain defined in (4).
Let us abuse the notation and denote with P˚L and piL also the Markov chain and the distribution defined
on the entire state space S, assuming P˚L(x,y) = 0 if x /∈ L or y /∈ L, and similarly piL(x) = 0 when
x /∈ L.
For L ⊆ S we set ∂L as the border of L, that is the set of profiles in L with at least a neighbor in
S \ L. Recall that τS\L is the random variable denoting the first time the Markov chain with transition
matrix P hits a profile x ∈ S \ L. The following lemma formally proves the intuitive fact that, by
starting from a profile in L the chain P and the chain P˚L are the same up to the time in which the former
chain hits a profile in S \L. The proof uses the well-known coupling technique (cf., e.g., [21]) which is
summarized in Appendix B.
Lemma 4.6. Let P be the transition matrix of a Markov chain with state space S and let P˚L be the
restriction of P to L ⊆ S, L 6= ∅, as given in (4). Then, for every x ∈ L and for every t > 0,∥∥∥P t(x, ·)− P˚ tL(x, ·)∥∥∥
TV
≤ Px (τS\L ≤ t) .
Proof. Consider the following coupling (Xt, Yt)t>0 of the Markov chains with transition matrix P and
P˚L, respectively:
• If Xi = Yi ∈ L \ ∂L, then we update the first chain according to P and obtain Xi+1; we then set
Yi+1 = Xi+1;
• If Xi = Yi ∈ ∂L, then we update the first chain according to P : if Xi+1 ∈ L, then we set
Yi+1 = Xi+1, otherwise we set Yi+1 = Yi;
• If Xi 6= Yi, then we update the chains independently.
Since X0 = Y0 = x ∈ L, we have that Xt 6= Yt only if τS\L ≤ t. Thus, by the properties of couplings
(see Theorem B.1), we have∥∥∥P t(x, ·)− P˚ tL(x, ·)∥∥∥
TV
≤ Px (Xt 6= Yt) ≤ Px (τS\L ≤ t) .
The following corollary follows from the Lemma 4.6 and the triangle inequality property of the total
variation distance.
Corollary 4.1. Let P the transition matrix of a Markov chain with state space S and let P˚L be the
restriction of P to a non-empty L ⊆ S as given in (4). Then, for every x ∈ L and for every t > 0,∥∥P t(x, ·)− piL∥∥TV ≤ ∥∥∥P˚ tL(x, ·)− piL∥∥∥TV +Px (τS\L ≤ t) .
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Using Corollary 4.1 we can prove Proposition 4.2.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. For each x ∈ Ti, by Corollary 4.1 and since Px
(
τS\Ri ≤ tRimix(ε)
)
≤ ε, we
obtain ∥∥∥P tRimix(ε)(x, ·)− µi∥∥∥
TV
≤ ε+ ε.
The lemma follows from the observation that tRimix(ε) is at most a polynomial by definition of partitioned
game.
Pseudo-mixing time starting from the remaining profiles. Consider the distributions µi defined
above (i.e., the stationary distribution restricted to Ri). We focus here on the convergence time to
distributions of the form
ν(y) =
∑
i
αiµi(y),
for αi ≥ 0 and
∑
i αi = 1. Specifically, for every profile x ∈ N , we define the distribution
νx(y) =
∑
i
µi(y) ·Px
(
XτS\N ∈ Ti | τS\N ≤ T εS\N (x)
)
, (5)
where T εS\N (x) is the first time step t in which Px (τS\L > t) ≤ ε. Observe that by definition of
τS\N , since the Ti’s and N are a partition of S, XτS\N ∈ ∪iTi is a certain event for all values of τS\N .
Moreover, by the definition of T εS\N (x), the event τS\N ≤ T εS\N (x) has non-zero probability and thus
we can condition on it. Thus,
∑
iPx
(
XτS\N ∈ Ti | τS\N ≤ T εS\N (x)
)
= 1. The above is then a valid
definition of the αi’s.
Then, we prove the following proposition.
Proposition 4.3. Let G be a n-player game and fix ε > 0. If G is partitioned by the logit dynamics
for β, then there is a function T = Tε at least super-polynomial in the input and a function p? at most
polynomial in the input such that for the given β, for every n large enough and for each x ∈ N the
corresponding distribution νx is (ε, T (n))-metastable and the pseudo-mixing time of νx from the profile
x is t{x}νx (3ε) = O(p?(n)).
Proof. Notice that, the distribution νx is a convex combination of distributions that are metastable for
super-polynomial time: thus, from Lemma 4.5, there exist a function T at least super-polynomial in the
input such that each such νx is (ε, T (n))-metastable.
Moreover, from the definition of partitioned game, we have that T εS\N (x) is at most a polynomial
ρ?(n) for any x ∈ N . Consider then the function p?(·) such that p?(n) = ρ?(n) + maxi tTiµi(ε). From
Proposition 4.2 and the fact that ρ? is at most polynomial, it turns out that p?(·) is at most a polynomial
function in the input. We complete the proof by showing that, for any sufficiently large n and any x ∈ N ,
p?(n) upper bounds the pseudo-mixing time t
{x}
νx (3ε) to νx from the profile x.
We set t? = p?(n), and denote with E the event “τS\N ≤ T εS\N (x)” and with E its complement.
Recall from Definition 2.1 that Xt denotes the state of the Markov chain defined by logit dynamics at
step t and observe that∥∥∥P t?(x, ·)− νx∥∥∥
TV
= max
A⊂S
|Px (Xt? ∈ A)− νx(A)|
= max
A⊂S
∣∣Px (Xt? ∈ A ∧ E)− νx(A) +Px (Xt? ∈ A ∧ E)∣∣
= max
A⊂S
∣∣Px (Xt? ∈ A | E) (1−Px (E))− νx(A) +Px (Xt? ∈ A | E)Px (E)∣∣
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≤ max
A⊂S
|Px (Xt? ∈ A | E)− νx(A)|+Px
(
E
)
≤ ‖Px (Xt? | E)− νx‖TV + ε,
where the definition of T εS\N (x) implies that Px (E) ≥ 1− ε > 0 and then yields the third equality and
last inequality. The penultimate inequality, instead, simply follows from the subadditivity of the absolute
value and the fact that the difference between two probabilities is upper bounded by 1. As every µi is
metastable for at least a super-polynomial number of steps, we have, by using τ? as a shorthand for τS\N ,
‖Px (Xt? | E)− νx‖TV =
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
i
∑
y∈Ti
Px (Xτ? = y | E) ·Px (Xt? | Xτ? = y ∧ E)− νx
∥∥∥∥∥∥
TV
≤
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
i
∑
y∈Ti
Px (Xτ? = y | E)
(
P t
?−τ?(y, ·)− µi
)∥∥∥∥∥∥
TV
≤
∑
i
∑
y∈Ti
Px (Xτ? = y | E)
∥∥∥P t?−τ?(y, ·)− µi∥∥∥
TV
≤ 2ε,
where the definition of τ? yields Xτ? ∈ Ti, for some i, which in turns yields the first equality by the law
of total probability. In the first inequality above, instead, we use the definition of νx and the fact that by
definition of t?, E implies t? − τ? ≥ t? − T εS\N (x) ≥ maxi tTiµi(ε); the second inequality follows from
a simple union bound; and the last inequality follows from Lemma 3.3 (note that t? − τ? satisfies the
hypothesis of the lemma: the lower bound is showed above, while the upper bound follows from the fact
that the µi’s are metastable for at least super-polynomial time). Hence, we have for every sufficiently
large n and every x ∈ N , t{x}νx (3ε) ≤ t? = p?(n).
5 Asymptotically well-behaved potential games
We now ask what class of potential games are partitioned by the logit dynamics. We know already
that the answer must differ from the whole class of potential games, due to Lemma 3.4. However, it
is important to understand to what extent it is possible to prove asymptotic metastability for potential
games.
Our main aim is to give results, asymptotic in the number n of players, about the behavior of logit
dynamics run on potential games. Clearly, it makes sense to give asymptotic results about the property
of an object, only if this property is asymptotically well-defined, that is, the object is uniquely defined for
infinitely many values of the parameter according to which we compute the asymptotic and the property
of this object does not depend chaotically on this parameter.
For example when we say that a graph has large expansion, we actually mean that there is a sequence
of graphs indexed by the number of vertices, such that the expansion of each graph can be bounded by
a single function of this number. Similarly, when we say that a Markov Chain has large mixing time,
we actually mean that there is a sequence of Markov chains indexed by the number of states, such that
the mixing time of each Markov chain can be bounded by a single function of this number. Yet another
example arises in algorithm game theory: when we say that the Price of Anarchy of a game is large, we
actually mean that there is a sequence of games indexed, for example, by the number of players such
that the Price of Anarchy of each game can be bounded by a single function of this number6.
6 Sometimes Price of Anarchy results do not refer to a single game, but to a class of games (e.g., congestion games). In this
case, we can explain the asymptotic result according to two different viewpoints. Indeed, we can see the game “horizontally”,
that is as a sequence of sets of instances, where each set contains all instances defined for some specified number of players.
Then the objects to which the asymptotic result refers is given by these sets of instances and we require that worst Price of
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In this work the object of interest is a potential game and the property of interest is the behavior of
the logit dynamics for this game. And thus, in our setting, it makes sense to give asymptotic results only
when a potential game is uniquely defined for infinitely many n and the behavior of the logit dynamics
for the potential game is not chaotic as n increases. However, giving a formal definition of what this
means is not as immediate as in the case of the expansion of a graph or of the Price of Anarchy of a
game. Thus, in order to gain insight on how to formalize this concept, let us look at some examples of
games for which the behavior of the logit dynamics is evidently “almost the same” as n increases (these
include the examples of partitioned games analyzed above) and examples in which this behavior instead
changes infinitely often.
CW-game. The behavior of logit dynamics for this game can be described in a way that is immaterial
from the actual value of n. Indeed, the potential function has two equivalent minima when either all
players adopt strategy −1 or all players adopt strategy +1 and it increases as the number of players
adopting a strategy different from the one played by the majority of agents increases. The potential
reaches its maximum when each strategy is adopted by the same number of players. Moreover, regard-
less of the actual value of n it is easy to see that if the number of +1 strategies is sufficiently larger
than the number of −1 strategies7, then it must be hard for the logit dynamics to reach a profile with
more −1’s than +1’s, whereas it must be easy for the dynamics to converge to the potential minimizer
in which all players are playing +1.
Thus the logit dynamics for the Curie-Weiss game is asymptotically well-behaved for our purposes,
since the evolution of the dynamics can be described in a way that is immaterial of the actual value of
n. In other words, the evolution of the dynamics when the number of players is n, can be mapped into
the evolution of the dynamics for smaller or larger numbers of players, such that the time necessary to
some events to happen (e.g., the time for reaching or leaving certain subsets of the profile space) can be
bounded by the same function of the number of players.
A similar argument holds even for the other partitioned games described in Section 4.2.
Pigou’s congestion game. Another example of game for which it is immediate to see that the behav-
ior of the logit dynamics does not change as the number of players increases is the well-known Pigou’s
congestion game: there are two links, one has fixed cost 1, whereas the second one has congestion-
dependent cost c/n, where c denotes the number of players choosing this second link. It is well
known that this game is a potential game [28], with potential function Φ(x) =
[
(n− c) + 1n
∑c
i=1 i
]
=
1
2n
(
2n2 − 2nc+ c(c+ 1)).
As above, the behavior of this game can be easily described in a way that is immaterial from the
actual value of n. Indeed, it is easy to check that the potential function is minimized in the profile in
which all players are using the second link, i.e., the one with congestion-dependent cost, it is maximized
in the profile in which all players are using the fixed-cost link, and, in general, the potential decreases
as the number of players adopting the second link increases. Thus, it happens that the logit dynamics
for this game quickly converges from any starting profile to the profile in which all players are on the
second link regardless of the value that n actually assumes8.
It is then evident that the behavior of the logit dynamics for Pigou’s example is asymptotically
well-defined and the evolution of the dynamics when the number of players is n can be mapped in
Anarchy in each set is bounded by a single function of the number of players. Similarly, we can see the game “vertically”, that
is as a set of games, where each game contains at most one instance for each number of players. Then the objects are these
games, and the bound on the Price of Anarchy is just the worst case bound among all games in the set. In this work, we will
assume this second viewpoint.
7The extent to which the number of +1 must be larger than the number of −1 can depend on n, but it can be bounded by a
single function F on the number of players.
8How quick the convergence is depends on the value of n, but this convergence time can be bounded by the same small
function of n.
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the evolution of the dynamics for smaller or larger numbers of players, so that the time for reaching
or leaving certain subsets of the profile space can be bounded by the same function of the number of
players.
A game for which the logit dynamics chaotically depends on n. Observe that, even though the
potential function of the game in Lemma 3.4 can be easily described solely as a function of n, just as
done for previous games, we cannot describe how the logit dynamics for this game and a given rationality
parameter β behaves as n changes. In particular, we are unable to describe through a single function
the time that is necessary for the logit dynamics to leave the profile in which all players are adopting
strategy 1. This time, by construction, changes infinitely often and, for any tentative bound, there will
always be a value of n from which that bound will turn out to be not correct.
Asymptotically well-behaved games: the definition. From the analysis of these games, it is evident
that the behavior of the logit dynamics for potential games is asymptotically well-defined when profiles
of the n-player game can be associated to profiles of the n′-player game such that the probability of leav-
ing associated profiles can be always bounded by the same function of the number of players. Formally,
we have the following definition.
Definition 5.1. The logit dynamics for a (potential) game is asymptotically well-behaved if there is n0
such that for every n ≥ n0 and for every L′ ⊆ S1 × · · · × Sn there is a subset L ⊆ S1 × · · · × Sn0 and
a function FL such that B(L) = Θ(FL(n0)) and B(L′) = Θ(FL(n)).
For sake of compactness, we will simply say that the potential game is asymptotically well-behaved
whenever the logit dynamics (run on it) is. We also call the constant n0 in the above definition the
asymptotic basis of the game.
The main result of our paper follows.
Theorem 5.1. Let G be an asymptotically well-behaved n-player potential game and let ∆(n) be the
function that, for every n, gives the Lipschitz constant of the potential function Φ for a game G with n
players, i.e.,
∆(n) := max {Φ(x)− Φ(y) : H(x,y) = 1} .
Then, for any function ρ at most polynomial in its input, G is asymptotically metastable for each β0 ≤
β ≤ ρ(n)∆(n) .
The proof builds upon Theorem 4.1 and proves that any asymptotic well-behaved potential game is
partitioned by the logit dynamics for β not too large as in the statement.
5.1 Proof of Theorem 5.1
We begin by highlighting a property of asymptotically well-behaved games will turn out to be very
important below.
Lemma 5.1. Let G be an asymptotically well-behaved n-player potential game and let n0 be its asymp-
totic basis. Then, there is a polynomial p and a super-polynomial q such that for any n ≥ n0 and for
every L′ ⊆ S1 × · · · × Sn, either B(L′) ≥ 1p(n) or B(L′) ≤ 1q(n) .
Proof. By definition of asymptotically well-behaved game, there is a subset L ⊆ S = S1 × · · · × Sn0
and a function FL, such that B(L′) = Θ(FL(n)). Since there are a finite number (specifically, at most
mn0) of such functions FL, we can always separate polynomials and super-polynomials ones. That is,
we can partition the subsets of S in two (possibly empty) subsets S′ and S′′ such that for any L in S′,
FL(n) ≥ 1/p(n) and, for any L in S′′, FL(n) ≤ 1/q(n), for any n ≥ n0 and for p polynomial and q
super-polynomial.
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Henceforth, we will say that the functions p, q are generated by the game G.
We now introduce a (computationally infeasible) algorithm that computes subsets R1, . . . , Rk of S
and a partition T1, . . . , Tk, N of S. Next we show that under the condition that the potential game is
asymptotically well-behaved, the sets returned by this algorithm enjoy the properties required by the
definition of partitioned games.
The procedure works its way by finding subsets of profiles that act as super-polynomial bottlenecks
for the Markov chain. The algorithm Ap,q takes in input an n-player asymptotically well-behaved po-
tential game G, a rationality level β, a constant ε > 0 and n; it is parametrized by two functions p at
most polynomial and q at least super-polynomial generated by G.
Algorithm 5.1 (Ap,q). Set N = S and i = 1. While there is a set L ⊆ N with pi(L) ≤ 1/2 such that
B(L) ≤ 1/q(n), do:
1. Denote with Ri one such subset with the smallest stationary probability;
2. Denote with Ti the largest subset of Ri such that for every y ∈ Ti,
Py
(
τS\Ri ≤ tRimix(ε)
)
≤ ε;
3. If Ti is not empty, return Ri and Ti, delete from N all profiles contained in Ti and increase i.
Otherwise, terminate the algorithm.
Observe that if there is a disconnected set L such that B(L) ≤ 1/q(n), then each connected compo-
nent L′ of L will have B(L′) ≤ 1/q(n) and smaller stationary probability: hence, the set Ri returned by
the algorithm will be connected. Note also that by Theorem 2.3 and the assumption that we are consid-
ering only cases in which the mixing time is super-polynomial, the algorithm above enters at least once
in the loop (and thus at least a subset Ri is computed).
Clearly the sets Ri returned by the algorithm enjoy the property of having super-polynomial bottle-
neck ratio and the sets Ti satisfy the requirement that, starting from any x ∈ Ti, it is unlikely to leave
Ri quickly. It is then left to prove that the mixing time of the chains restricted to Ri is polynomial and
that it is easy to leave the set N . This follows from the following propositions that are proved in the next
sections.
Proposition 5.1. Let G be an asymptotically well-behaved n-player potential game; fix ε > 0 and
a function ρ at most polynomial in its input. Let p, q be the functions generated by G. Consider the
sequence of sets Ri returned by Ap,q. For any n sufficiently large, if β0 ≤ β ≤ ρ(n)∆(n) then tRimix(ε) is at
most polynomial.
Proposition 5.2. Let G be an asymptotically well-behaved n-player potential game; fix ε > 0 and a
function ρ at most polynomial in its input. Let p, q the functions generated by G and recall that, for
x ∈ L and 0 < ε < 1, T εS\L(x) is defined as the first time step t in which Px (τS\L > t) ≤ ε. Consider
the set N returned by Ap,q. For any n sufficiently large, if β0 ≤ β ≤ ρ(n)∆(n) then T εS\N (x) is at most
polynomial.
This proves that asymptotically well-behaved potential games are partitioned by the logit dynamics
and, hence, they are asymptotically metastable, concluding the proof of Theorem 5.1.
5.2 Proof of Proposition 5.1
A high level idea of the proof of Proposition 5.1 is discussed next. We first give a spectral characteriza-
tion of the transition matrix defined in (4) (Lemma 5.3). Then we show that no subset of Ri has small
bottleneck ratio in the restricted chain (Lemma 5.4). Note that this does not directly follow from Ri
20
being the smaller possible subset with super-polynomial bottleneck ratio. Indeed, the bottleneck ratio of
a subset depends on the dynamics according to which it is computed. Thus, a subset can have a small
bottleneck ratio when computed within the reference frame of the restricted dynamics, but not when we
refer to the original dynamics. Nevertheless, we show that this is not the case. Specifically, we will
show that for asymptotically well-behaved games there is a relationship between the bottleneck ratio of
a subset of profiles in the restricted and in the original dynamics. Finally, the result follows from the
known relationship among mixing time, relaxation time and bottleneck ratio (see Theorems 2.2 and 2.4).
5.2.1 Spectral property of logit dynamics restrictions
In [3] it has been shown that all the eigenvalues of the transition matrix of logit dynamics for potential
games are non-negative. The technique used in that proof can be generalized to work also for some
restrictions of these matrices.
To begin, we note that the definition of reversibility can be extended in a natural way to any square
matrix and probability distribution over the set of rows of the matrix. We then state a fairly standard
result relating eigenvalues of matrices to certain inner products.
Lemma 5.2. Let P be a square matrix on state space S and pi be a probability distribution on S. If P is
reversible with respect to pi and has no negative eigenvalues then for any function f : S → R we have
〈Pf, f〉pi :=
∑
x∈S
pi(x)(Pf)(x)f(x) ≥ 0.
Proof. Let λ1, . . . , λs, s = |S|, be the eigenvalues of P . Moreover, let f1, . . . , fs denote their corre-
sponding eigenfunctions. For any x ∈ S, we then have (Pfi)(x)fi(x) = λifi(x). Since P is reversible
then we know that the eigenfunctions assume real values and that they form an orthonormal basis for the
space (Rs, 〈·, ·〉pi) (see, e.g., Lemma 12.2 in [21]). Then any real-valued function f defined upon S can
be expressed as a linear combination of the fi’s. Thus, there exist αi’s in R such that∑
x∈S
pi(x)(Pf)(x)f(x) =
∑
x∈S
pi(x)
s∑
i=1
α2i (Pfi)(x)fi(x) =
∑
x∈S
pi(x)
s∑
i=1
α2iλif
2
i (x) ≥ 0.
To specify the restrictions of the transition matrix we are interested in, let G be a game with profile
space S and let P be the transition matrix of the logit dynamics for G; we say that a |A|× |A|matrix P ′,
with A ⊆ S, is a nice restriction of P if there exists L ⊆ A, L 6= ∅, such that P ′(x,x) ≥ P (x,x) for
x ∈ L, P ′(x,y) = P (x,y) if x,y ∈ L, x 6= y, and is 0 otherwise. Note that P is a nice restriction of
itself. We generalize the result given in [3] to nice restrictions of the transition matrix of logit dynamics
for potential games.
Lemma 5.3. Let G be a game with profile space S, let P be the transition matrix of the logit dynamics
for G and let P ′ be a nice restriction of P with state space A. If P is reversible then no eigenvalue of P ′
is negative.
Proof. Firstly, note that if P is reversible with respect to pi then the nice restriction P ′, defined upon a
subset of states A, is reversible with respect to pi′ defined as pi restricted to A, i.e., pi′(x) = pi(x)/pi(A)
for x ∈ A.
Assume for sake of contradiction that there exists an eigenvalue λ < 0 of P ′. Let fλ be an eigen-
function of λ. Note that since P is reversible then fλ is real-valued. By definition, fλ 6= 0; hence,
since λ < 0 and as (P ′fλ)(x) = λfλ(x), then for every profile x ∈ A such that fλ(x) 6= 0 we have
sign ((P ′fλ)(x)) 6= sign (fλ(x)) and thus
〈P ′fλ, fλ〉pi′ =
∑
x∈A
pi′(x)(P ′fλ)(x)fλ(x) < 0.
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Let L denote the maximal subset of A for which P ′ is a nice restriction of P . Let us denote with
PL the transition matrix on the state space A such that PL(x,y) = P (x,y) for every x,y ∈ L and
PL(x,y) = 0 otherwise. Then we can write P ′ as PL + (P ′−PL): by the definition of nice restriction
(P ′ − PL) is a non-negative diagonal matrix. Therefore, (P ′ − PL) is reversible with respect to pi′.
Since the eigenvalues of a diagonal matrix are exactly the diagonal elements, we have that (P ′ − PL)
has non-negative eigenvalues and then, by Lemma 5.2, 〈(P ′ − PL)fλ, fλ〉pi′ ≥ 0. Moreover, for every i
and for every z−i, we denote with Pi,z−i the matrix such that for every x,y ∈ A
Pi,z−i(x,y) =
1
nZi(z−i)
{
eβui(y), if x−i = y−i = z−i and x,y ∈ L;
0, otherwise.
(6)
Observe that Pi,z−i has at least one non-zero row and that all non-zero rows of Pi,z−i are the same. Thus
Pi,z−i has rank 1, and hence since it is a non-negative matrix all its eigenvalues are non-negative [18]
9.
Moreover, since all off-diagonal entries of Pi,z−i are either 0 or equal to the corresponding entry of P
′ we
can conclude that Pi,z−i is reversible with respect to pi
′. Thus, Lemma 5.2 yields 〈Pi,z−ifλ, fλ〉pi′ ≥ 0.
Finally, observe that PL =
∑
i
∑
z−i Pi,z−i . Hence from the linearity of the inner product, it follows
that 〈P ′fλ, fλ〉pi′ ≥ 0 and thus we reach a contradiction.
It is immediate to see that the restricted chain P˚L defined in (4) is a nice restriction of P and hence
all its eigenvalues are non-negative by the theorem above.
5.2.2 Mixing time of the restricted chains
Before bounding the mixing time of the restricted chain we prove a very important preliminary lemma.
Lemma 5.4. Let G be an asymptotically well-behaved n-player potential game and fix β ≥ β0, ε > 0.
Let p, q the functions generated by G. Consider the sequence of sets Ri returned by Ap,q. Then, for n
sufficiently large and for any A ⊆ Ri, we have
BRi(A) ≥
1
p(n)
− 1
`(n)
,
where ` is at least super-polynomial.
Proof. Let us postpone the exact definition of ` and suppose, by contradiction, that there are infinitely
many n for which there is A ⊂ Ri such that BRi(A) < 1p(n) − 1`(n) .
We will show that for n sufficiently large either B (A) ≤ 1/q(n) or B(A) ≤ 1/q(n), where A =
Ri \ A. Then, since they are contained in Ri and hence their stationary probability is less than pi (Ri),
one of these set must be chosen before Ri by Ap,q. But since in the third step of Algorithm 5.1 either at
least one element of such sets should be deleted from N or the algorithm terminates, as a consequence,
we have that Ri cannot be returned by the algorithm, thus a contradiction.
Consider the function v(·) that sets v(n) = pi(A)Q(A,S\Ri) . We distinguish two cases depending on how
v evolves as n grows.
If v(·) is at least super-polynomial in the input: We have
B (A) =
Q (A,S \A)
pi (A)
=
Q (A,Ri \A)
pi (A)
+
Q (A,S \Ri)
pi (A)
=
∑
x∈A
∑
y∈Ri\A pi(x)P (x,y)
pi (A)
+
Q (A,S \Ri)
pi (A)
9This result about the eigenvalues of matrices with rank 1 appears as an exercise at page 61 of [18] and in [26].
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=∑
x∈A
∑
y∈Ri\A piRi(x)P˚Ri(x,y)
piRi (A)
+
Q (A,S \Ri)
pi (A)
= BRi (A) +
Q (A,S \Ri)
pi (A)
<
1
p(n)
+
1
v(n)
− 1
`(n)
.
By taking `(n) ≤ v(n) for each n sufficiently large, we have that B (A) < 1p(n) . Then, since G is
asymptotically well-behaved, from Lemma 5.1 it follows that B (A) ≤ 1q(n) .
If v(·) is polynomial in the input: Note that Q(A,S\Ri)pi(Ri) +
Q(A,S\Ri)
pi(Ri)
= B (Ri) ≤ 1q(n) , otherwise Ri was
not returned by the algorithm. Hence, we obtain
Q (A,S \Ri) ≤ 1
q(n)
· pi (Ri) and Q
(
A,S \Ri
) ≤ 1
q(n)
· pi (Ri) .
From the first of these inequalities, we have pi (A) ≤ v(n)q(n) · pi (Ri). Hence
Q
(
A,A
)
pi (Ri)
≤ v(n)
q(n)
· Q
(
A,A
)
pi (A)
=
v(n)
q(n)
·BRi (A) <
v(n)
q(n)
(
1
p(n)
− 1
`(n)
)
.
Then we obtain
B
(
A
)
=
Q
(
A,S \A)
pi
(
A
) = Q (A,A)
pi (Ri)− pi (A) +
Q
(
A,S \Ri
)
pi (Ri)− pi (A)
(by reversibility of P ) =
Q
(
A,A
)
pi (Ri)− pi (A) +
Q
(
A,S \Ri
)
pi (Ri)− pi (A)
≤ v(n)
q(n)
(
1
p(n)
− 1
`(n)
)(
1− v(n)
q(n)
)−1
+
1
q(n)
(
1− v(v)
q(n)
)−1
= O
(
1
q(n)− v(n)
)
,
where the upper bounds hold for each choice of super-polynomial function `. Since q(n)−v(n) evolves
at least as a super-polynomial, if n is sufficiently large, B(A) < 1p(n) . Then, since G is asymptotically
well-behaved, from Lemma 5.1 it follows that B
(
A
) ≤ 1q(n) .
Now we are ready to prove the mixing time of the chain restricted to Ri is polynomial.
Proof of Proposition 5.1. Consider the set of profiles A? ⊂ Ri that minimizes BRi (A) among all A ⊂
Ri such that piRi (A) ≤ 1/2. By Lemma 5.4, BRi (A?) ≥ 1/p(n)−1/`(n) for each n sufficiently large.
Moreover, for each n and each x ∈ Ri, since |S| ≤ m(n)n, it follows that
log
1
piRi (x)
≤ log |S|e
−βΦmin
e−βΦmax
≤ log e
n logm(n)e−βΦmin
e−βΦmax
= n logm(n) + β (Φmax − Φmin) ,
where Φmax and Φmin denote the maximum and minimum of the potential Φ overall possible strategy
profiles. Since Φmax − Φmin ≤ n ·∆(n) and β ≤ ρ(n)/∆(n), then
log
1
piRi (x)
≤ n · (logm(n) + ρ(n)) .
Then, since
(
1
p − 1`
)
= Θ
(
1
p
)
, from Lemma 5.3 and the properties of the relaxation time (see
Theorems 2.4 and 2.2) it follows that the mixing time is
tRimix(ε) ≤
(
1
p(n)
− 1
`(n)
)−2
· (n logm(n) + ρ(n)) · 2 log 4
ε
= O(p?(n)).
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Since p, logm and ρ are at most polynomial, then p? is at most polynomial in its input and the lemma
follows.
5.3 Proof of Proposition 5.2
In order to prove Proposition 5.2, we show that there is a strong relationship between hitting time and
metastability (see Lemma 5.9 and Lemma 5.10) and, in particular, that high hitting time implies the
existence of a subset with small bottleneck ratio. Note that N contains subsets of small bottleneck ratio
only if at some iteration Ti is empty. Therefore, it is sufficient to prove that the cores are not empty for
asymptotically well-behaved games (see Lemma 5.11).
5.3.1 The relation between bottleneck ratio and hitting time
For a game G with potential function Φ and profile space S, and a rationality level β, let P be the
transition matrix of the Markov chain defined by the logit dynamics on G. For a non-empty L ⊆ S, we
denote with PL the matrix
PL(x,y) =
{
P (x,y) if x,y ∈ L;
0 otherwise.
(7)
Let λL1 ≥ λL2 ≥ . . . ≥ λL|S| be the eigenvalues of PL: notice that λL1 can be different from 1 since the
matrix PL is not stochastic. Lemma 5.3 implies that λ
L
1 ≥ λL2 ≥ . . . ≥ λL|S| ≥ 0, and thus for λLmax, the
largest eigenvalue of PL in absolute value, we have: λ
L
max = maxi |λLi | = λL1 .
We start with two characterizations of 1− λLmax in terms of bottleneck ratio. The first one is an easy
extension of the similar characterization of the spectral gap of stochastic matrices.
Lemma 5.5. For finite β and any ∅ 6= L ⊆ S, 1− λLmax ≤ B(L).
Proof. Define the function ϕL : S → [0, 1] to be such that ϕL(x) = pi(L) if x ∈ L, and ϕL(x) = 0
otherwise. Consider now the function
EP (ϕL) := 1
2
∑
x,y∈S
pi(x)P (x,y)(ϕL(x)− ϕL(y))2. (8)
By Theorem 2.1, pi(L) 6= 0 and then Epi
[
ϕ2L
]
= pi(L)3 6= 0. Moreover, by recalling the definition
of ∂L as the set of profiles x ∈ L that have at least one neighbor profile in S \ L and denoting with
E(A1, A2) the pairs of neighbor profiles (x,y) such that x ∈ A1 and y ∈ A2. We have:
EP (ϕL) = pi(L)
2
2
 ∑
(x,y)∈E(L,S\L)
pi(x)P (x,y) +
∑
(x,y)∈E(S\L,L)
pi(x)P (x,y)

= pi(L)2
∑
x∈∂L
pi(x)
∑
y∈S\L :
H(x,y)=1
P (x,y) = pi(L)2Q(L, S \ L),
where we used the reversibility of P in the penultimate equality. Hence, we have EP (ϕL)
Epi[ϕ2L]
= B(L). The
lemma follows since 1− λLmax ≤ EP (ϕL)Epi[ϕ2L] (see Lemma A.1 in Appendix).
The second characterization may be proved in exactly the same way as a similar well-known char-
acterization for the spectral gap of stochastic matrices (see, for example, Section 13.3.3 in [21]).
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Lemma 5.6. For any ∅ 6= L ⊆ S,
1− λLmax ≥
(BL? )
2
2
.
Finally, let us recall a couple of lemmata relating τS\L and λLmax and already stated in e.g. [24].
Lemma 5.7. For a reversible Markov chain with state space S, any L ⊆ S and any t it holds that
max
x∈L
Px (τS\L > t) ≥ exp
(
t log λLmax
)
.
Lemma 5.8. For a reversible Markov chain with state space S, any L ⊆ S and any t it holds that
Px (τS\L > t) ≤ exp
(
t log λLmax +
1
2
log
1
piL(x)
)
,
where piL(x) has been defined in (3).
Since the statement of Lemma 5.8 is slightly different from the ones found in previous literature, we
provide a proof in Appendix A for sake of completeness.
The above lemmata represent the main ingredients to prove the following relations between bottle-
neck ratio and hitting time.
Lemma 5.9. Let G be a potential game with profile space S and let P be the transition matrix of the
logit dynamics for G. Then for finite β and L ⊂ S, L 6= ∅, we have
min
x∈L
Px (τS\L ≤ t) ≤ t · B(L)
1−B(L) .
Proof. We observe:
min
x∈L
Px (τS\L ≤ t) = 1−max
x∈L
Px (τL > t)
(by Lemma 5.7) ≤ 1− exp
(
t log λLmax
)
= 1− exp
(
t log(1− (1− λLmax))
)
(since 1− a ≥ e− a1−a ) ≤ 1− exp
(
−t1− λ
L
max
λLmax
)
(by Lemma 5.5) ≤ 1− exp
(
−t · B(L)
1−B(L)
)
(since 1− e−a ≤ a) ≤ t · B(L)
1−B(L) .
Moreover, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 5.10. Let G be a potential game with profile space S and P be the transition matrix of the logit
dynamics for G. For β > 0, ∅ 6= L ⊂ S, x ∈ L and 0 < ε < 1, we have
T εS\L(x) ≤ (BL? )−2
(
2(1− ε)
ε
+ log
1
piL(x)
)
,
where piL(x) =
pi(x)
pi(L) and B
L
? = min A⊆L :
pi(A)≤1/2
B(A).
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Proof. From Lemma 5.8 we know that the hitting time of S \ L can be expressed as a function of the
eigenvalues of the matrix PL. In particular, we have
Px (τS\L > t) ≤ exp
(
t log λLmax +
1
2
log
1
piL(x)
)
(since 1− a ≤ e−a) ≤ exp
(
−t
(
1− λLmax
)
+
1
2
log
1
piL(x)
)
(by Lemma 5.6) ≤ exp
[
−1
2
(
t(BL? )
2 − log 1
piL(x)
)]
(since e−a ≤ (1 + a)−1) ≤
(
1 +
1
2
(
t(BL? )
2 − log 1
piL(x)
))−1
.
Thus, by setting t = (BL? )
−2
(
2(1−ε)
ε + log
1
piL(x)
)
, we have Px (τS\L > t) ≤ ε and then T εS\L(x) is
upper bounded by this value of t.
5.3.2 Bounding the hitting time
The following lemma turns out to be useful for proving fast hitting time of profiles not in N .
Lemma 5.11. Let G be an asymptotically well-behaved n-player potential game and fix β ≥ β0, ε > 0.
Let p, q the functions generated by G. Then, for each n sufficiently large, at the end of algorithm Ap,q
on input G, β, ε and n it holds that for each subset L ⊆ N such that pi(L) ≤ 1/2, B(L) ≥ 1/p(n).
Proof. It is sufficient to prove that for each Ri chosen by Ap,q, its core Ti is non-empty. Indeed, in this
case, the algorithm ends only if no subset L ⊆ N such that pi(L) ≤ 1/2 has B(L) > 1/q(n). Then,
since G is asymptotically well-behaved, from Lemma 5.1 it follows that the last condition is equivalent
to B(L) ≥ 1/p(n).
As for the non-emptiness of the core, Lemma 5.9 implies that there exists at least one x ∈ Ri such
that
Px
(
τS\Ri ≤ tRimix(ε)
)
≤ t
Ri
mix(ε) ·B(Ri)
1−B(Ri) ≤ ε,
where the last step holds for n sufficiently large since tRimix is at most polynomial by Proposition 5.1 and
B(Ri) is at most the inverse of a super-polynomial by hypothesis.
We are now ready to prove Proposition 5.2
Proof of Proposition 5.2. Consider the set of profiles A? ⊆ N that minimizes B (A) among all A ⊆ N
such that pi (A) ≤ 1/2. By Lemma 5.11, B (A?) ≥ 1/p(n). Moreover, for each n and each x ∈ N ,
observe that
log
1
piN (x)
≤ log |S|e
−βΦmin
e−βΦmax
≤ log e
n logm(n)e−βΦmin
e−βΦmax
= n logm(n) + β (Φmax − Φmin) ,
where Φmax and Φmin denote the maximum and minimum of the potential Φ overall possible strategy
profiles. Since Φmax − Φmin ≤ n ·∆(n) and β ≤ ρ(n)/∆(n), then
log
1
piN (x)
≤ n · (logm(n) + ρ(n)) = ρ′(n),
where, by assumption on m and ρ, ρ′ is a function at most polynomial in its input. Then, for every
x ∈ N , from Lemma 5.10 it follows
T εS\N (x) ≤
(
1
B (A?)
)2
·
(
2(1− ε)
ε
+ log
1
piN (x)
)
≤ p(n)2 ·
(
2(1− ε)
ε
+ ρ′(n)
)
= ρ?(n),
26
where ρ? is a function at most polynomial in its input, since p and ρ′ are.
6 Conclusions and open problems
In this work we prove that for any asymptotically well-behaved potential game and any starting point of
this game there is a distribution that is metastable for super-polynomial time and it is quickly reached.
In the proof we also give a sufficient condition for a game (not necessarily potential) to enjoy this
metastable behavior. It is a very interesting open problem to prove that this property is also necessary.
The main obstacle for this direction consists of the fact that we do not know any tool for proving or
disproving metastability of distributions that are largely different from the ones considered in this work.
Also, given that our arguments are game-independent, it would be interesting to see whether sufficient
and necessary conditions can be refined for specific subclass of games.
Our convergence rate results hold if β is small enough. As we mention above, an assumption on β
is in general necessary because when β is high enough logit dynamics roughly behaves as best-response
dynamics. Moreover, in this case, the only metastable distributions have to be concentrated around the
set of Nash equilibria. This is because for β very high, it is extremely unlikely that a player leaves a Nash
equilibrium. Then, the hardness results about the convergence of best-response dynamics for potential
games, cf. e.g. [15], imply that the convergence to metastable distributions for high β is similarly
computationally hard. Interestingly, this difference in the behavior of the logit dynamics for different
values of β suggests that “the more noisy the system is, the more (meta)stable it is.”
Our result is in a sense existential, since it is unpractical to explicitly describe the distributions via
the execution of Algorithm 5.1. It is then an interesting open problem to characterize the sets Ri’s and
Ti’s returned by this algorithm for some specific class of games in order to understand better the stability
guarantee of the distributions. A better understanding of spectra of the transition matrix along the lines
of the results we prove in Section D may help in answering some of the questions above.
Naturally, there are other questions of general interest about metastability that we do not consider.
For example, akin to price of anarchy and price of stability, one may ask what is the performance of a
system in a metastable distribution? One might also want to investigate metastable behavior of different
dynamics in potential games, such as best-response dynamics. However, in the latter case, no matter
what selection rule is used to choose which player has to move next, a profile is never visited twice
in time since at each step the potential goes down. Therefore, the “transient” behavior of best-response
dynamics would roughly correspond to a (possibly exponentially long) sequence of profiles visited. This,
however, would not add much to our understanding of the transient phase of best-response dynamics.
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A Hitting time tools
Consider a reversible Markov chain with state space S and transition matrix P . ForL ⊆ S let PL, λLi and
λLmax as defined in Section 5.3.1. Here we give a well known (see, e.g., [24]) variational characterization
of λLmax as expressed by the following lemma.
Lemma A.1. Consider a reversible Markov chain with state space S, transition matrix P and stationary
distribution pi. For any L ⊆ S we have
1− λLmax = infϕ
EP (ϕ)
Epi [ϕ2]
,
where EP (ϕ) is defined as in (8), Epi
[
ϕ2
]
=
∑
x pi(x)ϕ
2(x) and the inf is taken over functions ϕ such
that ϕ(x) = 0 for x ∈ S \ L and Epi
[
ϕ2
] 6= 0.
Since the statement of Lemma 5.8 is slightly different from the ones found in previous literature, we
attach a proof for sake of completeness.
Proof of Lemma 5.8. Let ϕL be the characteristic function on L, that is ϕL(x) = 1 if x ∈ L and 0
otherwise. Then
Px (τS\L > t) =
∑
y∈S
P t
L
(x,y) =
∑
y∈S
P t
L
(x,y)ϕL(y) = (P
t
L
ϕL)(x). (9)
Since PL is reversible with respect to piL, we have that its eigenvectors, ψ1, . . . , ψ|S|, form an orthonor-
mal basis with respect to the inner product 〈·, ·〉piL : in particular we can write ϕL =
∑
i αiψi, where∑
i αi = 1 and each αi ≥ 0. Hence and from the linearity of the inner product we have
〈P t
L
ϕL, P
t
L
ϕL〉piL =
∑
i
∑
j
〈αi
(
λLi
)t
ψi, αj
(
λLj
)t
ψj〉piL
(by orthogonality) =
∑
i
(
λLi
)2t 〈αiψi, αiψi〉piL
≤
(
λLmax
)2t 〈ϕL, ϕL〉piL = (λLmax)2t ,
(10)
where the last equality follow from the definition of ϕL. Moreover,
piL(x)[(P
t
L
ϕL)(x)]
2 ≤
∑
y∈S
piL(y)[(P
t
L
ϕL)(y)]
2 = 〈P t
L
ϕL, P
t
L
ϕL〉piL . (11)
The theorem follows from (9), (10), (11).
B Markov chain coupling
A coupling of two probability distributions µ and ν on a state space S is a pair of random variables
(X,Y ) defined on S × S such that the marginal distribution of X is µ and the marginal distribution of
Y is ν. A coupling of a Markov chainM on S with transition matrix P is a process (Xt, Yt)∞t=0 with
the property that Xt and Yt are both Markov chains with transition matrix P . Similarly, a coupling of
Markov chainsM, M¯ both defined on S with transition matrices P and P¯ , respectively, is a process
(Xt, Yt)
∞
t=0 with the property that Xt is a Markov chain with transition matrix P and Yt is a Markov
chain with transition matrix P¯ .
When the two coupled chains start at (X0, Y0) = (x,y), we write Px,y (·) for the probability of an
event on the space S×S. The following theorem, which follows from Proposition 4.7 and Theorem 5.2
in [21] establishes the importance of this tool.
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Theorem B.1 (Coupling). Let M, M¯ be two Markov chains with finite state space S and transition
matrices P and P¯ , respectively. For each pair of states x,y ∈ S consider a coupling (Xt, Yt) ofM and
M¯ with starting states X0 = x and Y0 = y. Then∥∥P t(x, ·)− P¯ t(y, ·)∥∥
TV
≤ Px,y (Xt 6= Yt) .
C Asymptotic well-classified games
It is natural to ask if asymptotic metastability can hold even for potential games that are not asymptot-
ically well-behaved. Lemma 3.4 states that this is not the case in general, but we wonder if there are
conditions on potential games that are sufficient for asymptotic metastability. In this section we show
that the framework described above can give a slightly more general condition than being asymptotically
well-behaved.
To get an intuition of the condition that we are going to define, it is worth looking more closely at
the game of Lemma 3.4, known to be not partitioned by the logit dynamics (cf. Lemma 4.4). This game
necessitates the update of the function T infinitely often when adding a new player. This update is done
so that the new profile (1, . . . , 1) has a bottleneck ratio that cannot be described by any of the functions
considered at that point. This process is never ending and gives no asymptotic meaning to T in the limit.
The intuition is then that a game cannot be partitioned by the logit dynamics when for each choice
of a polynomial p, a super-polynomial q and infinitely many values of n, there is a subset of states L
with n players such that pi(L) < 1/2 and
p(n) < B−1(L) < q(n).
A sufficient property can then assume that we can asymptotically classify the bottleneck ratio of each
subset of profiles as either polynomial or super-polynomial. More specifically, we can assume there are
two functions p at most polynomial in the input and q at least super-polynomial in the input such that for
each β and each subset A the bottleneck ratio B(A) can be bounded by functions that depends on either
p or q. An equivalent viewpoint would be to see n-player potential games as a class to which a kind of
oracle is attached that distinguishes between polynomial and super-polynomial bottleneck ratios for any
fixed β. Formally, given a n-player potential game G and fixed β ≥ β0, this oracle can be described
as follows: when it is queried about the bottleneck ratio of a subset A with n players its answer states
that the bottleneck ratio is either i) at most polynomial if it is lower-bounded by 1/p(n); or ii) at least
super-polynomial if it is upper-bounded by 1/q(n).
Lemma 5.1 actually proves that this property holds for asymptotically well-behaved games. How-
ever, a more careful look to the game of Lemma 3.4 highlights that to prove asymptotic metastability of
a game with respect to a polynomial p and a super-polynomial q we do not need the behavior of each
subset to be classified. That is, we can allow some subsets of profiles to have bottleneck ratio in between
the inverse of q and the inverse of p. In this case, we will say that the subset of profiles is unclassified.
Our next condition then describes which class of subsets is sufficient to classify in order to have
that the sets returned by the Algorithm 5.1 enjoy the properties required by the definition of partitioned
games. In particular, we define the class of asymptotically well-classified games as follows.
Definition C.1 (Asymptotically well-classified games). An n-player potential games G is asymptotically
well-classified if for every β ≥ β0, ε > 0 there exist a pair of functions p at most polynomial and q at
least super-polynomial, that for each n sufficiently large, satisfy the following conditions:
1. q(n) ≤ maxL : pi(L)≤1/2B−1(L);
2. for each Ri computed byAp,q and for any L ⊂ Ri such that piRi(L) ≤ 1/2, if BRi(L) < 1/p(n),
then both B(L) and B(Ri \ L) are not unclassified;
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3. for each subset L ⊆ N , N being as at the end of the algorithmAp,q, such that pi(L) ≤ 1/2, B(L)
is not unclassified.
By careful looking at their proofs, one can check that Proposition 5.1 and Proposition 5.2 continue
to hold even if we substitute asymptotically well-behaved potential games with asymptotically well-
classified ones.
D Spectral properties of the logit dynamics
We next give other interesting spectral results about the transition matrix generated by the logit dynam-
ics. In particular, by using a matrix decomposition similar to the one adopted in the proof of Lemma 5.3
we can prove the following propositions. (We remark that results in this section do not need to assume
that the chain is reversible and indeed apply to any strategic game and not only to potential games.)
Proposition D.1. Let G be a game with profile space S and let P be the transition matrix of the logit
dynamics for G. The trace of P is independent of β.
Proof. For every i and for every z−i consider the transition matrices Pi,z−i defined in (6), with L = S.
Let Si,z−i = {(z−i, si) | si ∈ Si}. Observe that for every x ∈ Si,z−i we have Pi,z−i(x,x) = 1 −∑
y∈Si,z−i ,y 6=x P (x,y). Hence, the trace of Pi,z−i is∑
x∈Si,z−i
Pi,z−i(x,x) = |Si| −
∑
x∈Si,z−i
∑
y∈Si,z−i ,y 6=x
P (x,y).
Since all non-zero elements in a column of Pi,z−i are the same we also have
Pi,z−i(x,x) =
1
|Si| − 1
∑
y∈Si,z−i ,y 6=x
P (y,x).
By setting C =
∑
x∈Si,z−i
∑
y∈Si,z−i ,y 6=x P (x,y) =
∑
x∈Si,z−i
∑
y∈Si,z−i ,y 6=x P (y,x), we have
|Si| − C = C|Si| − 1 =⇒ C = |Si| − 1,
and thus, the trace of Pi,z−i is always 1, regardless of β. The proposition follows since the trace of P is
exactly the sum of the traces of all Pi,z−i’s.
The proposition above says that if there exists an eigenvalue of P that gets closer to 1 as β increases,
then there are other eigenvalues that get smaller: this is very promising in the tentative to characterize
the entire spectrum of eigenvalues of P , necessary to use powerful tools such as the well-known random
target lemma [21].
In order to prove our last characterization of the transition matrix generated by the logit dynamics,
we prove the following lemma which gives a lower bound on the probability that the strategy profile is
not changed in one step of the logit dynamics for a generic game.
Lemma D.1. Let G be a game with profile space S and let P be the transition matrix of the logit
dynamics for G. Then for every x ∈ S we have that
P (x,x) =
∑
i
P
(
(x−i, s?i ),x
)
,
where s?i 6= xi is an arbitrary strategy of player i.
32
Proof. Observe that
P (x,x) = 1−
∑
y∈N(x)
P (x,y) =
∑
i
 1
n
−
∑
y∈Ni(x)
P (x,y)

=
∑
i
1
n
1− ∑
y∈Ni(x)
eβui(y)
eβui(x) +
∑
z∈Ni(x) e
βui(z)
 = ∑
i
1
n
eβui(x)
eβui(x) +
∑
z∈Ni(x) e
βui(z)
.
The proof concludes by observing that for every i and for every s?i ∈ Si, we have
P
(
(x−i, s?i ),x
)
=
1
n
eβui(x)
eβui(x) +
∑
z∈Ni(x) e
βui(z)
.
Lemma D.1 allows us to calculate the determinant of P .
Proposition D.2. Let G be a game with profile space S and let P be the transition matrix of the logit
dynamics for G. The determinant of P is 0.
Proof. It is well-known that a matrix in which one row can be expressed as a linear combination of other
rows has determinant zero. In this proof, we fix a profile x and show that the row of P corresponding to
x can be obtained as a linear combination of other rows of the matrix. For each player i, fix a strategy
s?i ∈ Si such that s?i 6= xi. Let us denote with Sj , j = 0, . . . , n, the set of profiles y ∈ S obtained
from x by selecting j players i1, . . . , ij and setting their strategies to s?i1 , . . . , s
?
ij
, respectively. Notice
that x belongs to S0. By construction, for every profile z ∈ Sj , zi ∈ {xi, s?i }. Now, for i = 1, . . . , n,
consider the profile obtained from z by changing zi = xi into s?i or viceversa. Note that there are n of
such profiles which are neighbors of z and all contained in the sets Sj−1 and Sj+1. We claim that for
every y ∈ S
P (x,y) =
n∑
j=1
(−1)j+1
∑
z∈Sj
P (z,y). (12)
In order to prove the claim we distinguish three cases:
1. Let H(x,y) > 1 (and thus P (x,y) = 0): if there exists j ∈ {0, . . . , n} such that y ∈ Sj ,
then the r.h.s. of (12) becomes ±
(
P (y,y) −∑i P ((y−i, s?i ),y)) = 0, from Lemma D.1; if
y /∈ ⋃nj=0 Sj , then consider a profile z ∈ Sj , for some j = 1, . . . , n, such that z differs from y
only in the strategy of player k: if no such profile exists, then the r.h.s. of (12) is 0; otherwise,
let us assume w.l.o.g. zk = xk (the case zk = s?k can be managed similarly), then the profile
z′ = (z−k, s?k) is a neighbor of y, belongs to the set S
j+1 and P (z,y) = P (z′,y): hence, this
two profiles delete each other in the r.h.s. of (12), giving the aimed result.
2. Let x,y differ in the strategy adopted by the player k: if there exists j ∈ {0, . . . , n} such that
y ∈ Sj , then the r.h.s. of (12) becomes P (y,y) − ∑i 6=k P ((y−i, s?i ),y) = P (x,y), from
Lemma D.1; if y /∈ ⋃nj=0 Sj , then, as above, all profiles in⋃nj=0 Sj that differ from y only in one
player i 6= k delete each other in the r.h.s. of (12): thus, the only element that survives in the r.h.s.
of (12) is P
(
(x−k, xk),y
)
= P (x,y).
3. If x = y, then the r.h.s. of (12) becomes
∑
i 6=k P
(
(y−i, s?i ),y
)
= P (x,x), from Lemma D.1.
Since, as observed above, the logit dynamics for potential games defines a reversible Markov chain,
Lemma 5.3 and Proposition D.2 imply that the last eigenvalue of the logit dynamics for these games
is exactly 0. (Note that in [3] is only stated the last eigenvalue is non-negative.) Moreover, from the
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proof above, it turns out that an eigenvector of such zero eigenvalue is given by the function f : S → R
defined as
f(w) =

−1, if w ∈ Sj and j is even;
1, if w ∈ Sj and j is odd;
0, otherwise;
where the sets Sj’s are defined as in the above proof from some fixed profile x.
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